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BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES: 

COCAINE SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER 

JACOB LOSHlN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines and, with the stroke of a pen, unset­
tled more than two decades of established sentencing practice. l 
Booker held that the highly detailed Sentencing Guidelines would 
now be merely "advisory" rather than mandatory,2 and that judges 
would now have discretion to impose sentences subject only to the 
constraint that the sentences be "reasonable."3 Some recoiled at 
this apparent nod to judicial discretion. Others welcomed it as a 
chance to rethink a system that had not lived up to expectations. 
But all saw it as a major source of conceptual, doctrinal, and practi­
cal disorder. As one judge trenchantly remarked, Booker "abruptly 
disengaged the most thorough and carefully considered regime of 
criminal sentencing in history and ... substituted a two-word re­
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007. Thanks to Kate Stith and Nina Good­
man for their help and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
2. [d. at 246 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
3. [d. at 261. 
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gime of criminal sentencing (perhaps the most abbreviated in his­
tory)-the regime of the 'reasonable sentence.'''4 
Shortly after Booker, this most ambiguous and abbreviated re­
gime of criminal sentencing collided with one of the most contro­
versial and prolonged substantive issues in criminal sentencing: the 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, drug sentences vary based on the quantity 
of drugs possessed, and possession of just one gram of crack cocaine 
is punished as harshly as possession of 100 grams of powder co­
caine.s Known as the "100:1 ratio," this disparity between crack 
and powder sentences has earned strident criticism and fomented 
much controversy over the past decade.6 Many observers consider 
the ratio to be irrational and unfair, inflicting a disparate impact on 
African-Americans, who tend to be far more likely to receive crack 
convictions than powder convictions. Indeed, much of this criticism 
has come from sentencing judges themselves.7 Yet, prior to 
Booker, judges could do very little about it. The Sentencing Guide­
lines were mandatory, and all constitutional challenges to the 100:1 
ratio failed. 8 In the wake of Booker, however, the issue has 
reemerged as sentencing judges begin to use their newfound discre­
tion to undermine the 100:1 ratio.9 Many judges have cited their 
disapproval of the ratio as a reason for imposing shorter sentences 
than those recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, and appel­
late courts must now struggle with the question of whether such 
sentences satisfy Booker's standard of "reasonableness."l0 
This Article examines the crack-powder ratio in light of 
Booker's transformation of federal sentencing. Specifically, it con­
siders the degree to which sentencing judges must continue to abide 
by the 100:1 ratio advised by the Sentencing Guidelines. In doing 
4. United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364-65 (M.D. Fla. 
2006). 
5. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1(C)(1l) (2006). 
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
9. To my knowledge, this reemergence has not yet been addressed in the schol­
arly literature. The popular press and legal advocacy groups, however, have given it 
much attention. See, e.g., Gary Fields, Judges Show More Lenience on Crack Cocaine, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,2006, at 2A; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
ACLU and Sentencing Experts Renew Call for Federal Courts to Uphold Judges' Right 
to Reject loo-to-l CrackIPowder Sentencing Disparity (May 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.orgldrugpolicy/sentencing/25604prs20060518.html. 
10. See infra Parts II.B.l (discussing judicial approval) and III.C (discussing ap­
pellate approaches). 
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so, this Article approaches the debate in three different ways-one 
conceptual, one doctrinal, and one practical-and it attempts to 
weave these strands into an argument for moderation. 
Conceptually, this Article distinguishes between two different 
and underappreciated ways of thinking about Booker's sentencing 
doctrine. The first approach, which I shall call "substantive reason­
ableness," seeks to identify the best sentence measured by generally 
accepted purposes of punishment.11 The second approach, which I 
shall call "structural reasonableness," does not seek to identify the 
substantively "correct" sentence; rather, it asks who is in the best 
position to decide particular questions related to sentencing. Sub­
stantive reasonableness has been the dominant mode of post­
Booker analysis. However, this Article contends that it cannot re­
solve the issue of the crack-powder ratio, since the substantive cri­
teria Booker requires courts to consider result in irresolvable 
analytical gridlock. Hence, structural reasonableness offers a more 
promising approach. This Article seeks to flesh out this under-the­
orized structural alternative and use it to resolve the crack-powder 
issue. 
Doctrinally, this Article argues that sentencing judges should 
not categorically reject the 100:1 Guidelines ratio, as some have 
been inclined to do. Instead, structural reasonableness demands a 
more nuanced division of responsibilities: Individualized decisions 
about a particular offender ought to be made by the sentencing 
judges who know offenders best and who are better able to make 
fact-intensive distinctions; in contrast, policy decisions-such as 
drug quantity ratios-that affect large classes of offenders or the 
relative relationship between offenses ought to be made by the leg­
islative branch. Finally, appellate courts should police the bounda­
ries between individualized and policy-based sentencing rationales 
through a two-tiered scrutiny regime. 
Practically, this Article argues that the structural approach of­
fers the most fair and flexible judicial solution to what has been an 
intractable and contentious dispute over cocaine sentencing. The 
best arguments against the 100:1 ratio are individualized in nature. 
Hence, within reason, judges should rely on such individualized fac­
tors to justify below-Guidelines sentences. Judges should exercise 
their Booker discretion by being more lenient in particular situa­
11. The Court held in Booker that such decisions should be guided by the princi­
ples of sentencing outlined in 18 U.s.c. § 3553(a). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 261 (2005). 
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tions where the Guidelines are too harsh. However, to the extent 
judges rely on generalized rationales that affect every crack defen­
dant regardless of circumstances, they tread on decisions more 
properly made by Congress. Hence, the structural distinction be­
tween individualized and policy-based rationales achieves a balance 
between these objectives, limiting unfair consequences of the 100:1 
ratio without overstepping judicial bounds. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys the post­
Booker sentencing scene, explaining the new doctrinal framework 
and exploring empirical data that reveal Booker's impact on co­
caine sentencing. Part II considers the substantive approach to co­
caine sentencing. It offers a short history of the cocaine sentencing 
controversy and argues that the controversy cannot be resolved on 
substantive grounds. Part III outlines the structural alternative and 
argues that it offers a better solution. This part seeks to flesh out 
the distinction between individualized and policy-based sentencing 
rationales, and it sketches a proposed structural regime. Part IV 
offers some examples of how the structural approach works in 
practice. 
I. THE POST-BOOKER LANDSCAPE 
A. Booker's Doctrine 
The current federal sentencing regime constitutes the third act 
of a drama that spans the past half-century. The first act, which 
began in America's early days but reached its crescendo during the 
1960s and 1970s, relied on a rehabilitative ideal of sentencing that 
granted sentencing judges nearly unrestrained authority to tailor 
appropriate sentencesJ2 However, by the 1970s, this discretionary 
regime came under vigorous attack. Critics argued that the discre­
tionary system produced arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes, re­
sulting in undue disparity between the sentences of offenders 
convicted of similar crimes.13 
Hence, in 1984, Congress reacted to this lack of confidence in 
judicial discretion by passing the Sentencing Reform Act,14 thereby 
12. For a concise history of early federal criminal sentencing in the United States, 
see KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-37 (1998). 
13. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER (1973) (providing an influential critique). 
14. The Sentencing Reform Act became part of the Comprehensive Crime Con­
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 18 U.S.c. (2000». 
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opening the second act in our federal sentencing drama. The Sen­
tencing Reform Act created the independent United States Sen­
tencing Commission and delegated authority to the Commissi.:>n to 
establish a set of mandatory guidelines for determining criminal 
sentences. IS The resulting Sentencing Guidelines dictated federal 
criminal sentences with a high degree of specificity, leaving little 
room for judges to exercise their own judgment in sentencing. 
Under the Guidelines, sentence lengths were calculated using a 
complex formula that integrated the offender's underlying crime, 
specific attributes of the crime, other relevant attributes, and the 
offender's criminal history. For each category of crime, the Guide­
lines dictated a Base Offense Level, which was then adjusted to ac­
count for "specific offense characteristics" indicative of the severity 
of the offense. In drug cases, the most important characteristic de­
termining sentence length was quantity.16 For example, a defen­
dant convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams of 
crack would have received a Base Offense Level of twenty-sixP 
The level would have then been increased or decreased based on 
other "relevant conduct" and "offense adjustments" associated with 
the crime, such as other crimes committed, the vulnerability of the 
victim, or the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. Finally, the 
defendant's Criminal History Category would have been computed, 
based on the number and severity of prior offenses. The final Of­
fense Level and Criminal History Category calculations would then 
have been plotted on a matrix that dictated the offender's sentence 
in the form of a range, indicating a minimum and maximum sen­
tence length.Is In our example, if the offender had no criminal his­
tory and no offense adjustments, the guidelines would require a 
sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. 
This algorithmic approach to sentencing left little room for ju­
dicial discretion. Judges could choose within the narrow range 
15. 28 U.S.c. § 991 (2000). The Commission's Guidelines become binding six 
months after official promulgation, unless Congress votes to disapprove them. See 28 
U.S.c. § 994(p) (2000); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (uphold­
ing the constitutionality of Congress's delegation to the Commission). 
16. Quantity factors are easy to measure objectively, but critics have questioned 
whether the Guidelines' strong reliance on quantity appropriately captures the degree 
of culpability and harm associated with a given crime. See STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 12, at 69-70. In the case of drug crimes, quantity of drugs possessed is an imperfect 
proxy for an offender's role in a drug-dealing operation. The kingpin may get caught 
with the "mother lode," or he may not. The focus on quantity trades a flexible, subjec­
tive judgment for an imperfect, objective proxy. 
17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2Dl.l. 
18. [d. § SA. 
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computed from the Guidelines, and they could also "depart" from 
the Guidelines' range in cases where the defendant's offense dif­
fered substantially from the "heartland" case envisioned by the 
Guidelines.19 However, the Guidelines closely circumscribed per­
missible reasons for such departures.2o Moreover, statutory 
mandatory minimums further constrained discretion by creating ab­
solute sentencing floors for certain offenses, which judges could not 
easily avoid. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court opened the third act of our sen­
tencing drama with United States v. Booker.21 In a five to four deci­
sion, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury insofar as they increased 
defendants' sentences on the basis of facts not found by a jury.22 
However, instead of invalidating the Sentencing Reform Act or re­
quiring juries to decide all sentencing-related factual issues, a sepa­
rate five to four majority held that the Guidelines could be saved 
from constitutional error through a small (but consequential) judi­
cial revision of the statute-specifically, a transformation of the 
Guidelines from mandatory to "advisory."23 If the Guidelines are 
no longer binding on judges, the jury right does not attach to sen­
tencing-related fact finding. Or so the Court reasoned.24 Of 
19. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996), superseded by statute, PRO­
TECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003). 
20. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 5K2.1O-2.13, 
2.16. As Stith and Cabranes have observed, the Guidelines' grounds for downward 
departure are limited to "situations in which the substantive criminal law recognizes a 
partial or full defense to a crime." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 74. Many 
other rationales for downward departure-including a defendant's "minor role in a 
crime, diminished mental capacity ... age, health, [and] familial responsibility"-had 
been rejected by appellate courts. [d. at 100. The most common ground for downward 
departure is the finding that a defendant has provided "substantial assistance" to prose­
cutors. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5K1.1. 
Departure discretion was also further constrained in 2003, when Congress overturned 
Koon's abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of sentences and replaced it 
with a de novo standard. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat. 
650. 
21. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). More precisely, this act began a 
year earlier with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which invalidated Wash­
ington's state sentencing guidelines. Booker applied Blakely's logic, inevitably, to the 
federal Guidelines. 
22. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
23. Id. at 245 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
24. One might charitably describe the Court's logic as opaque. Nevertheless, the 
merits of the Booker decision lie beyond the scope of this Article. Here, we are more 
concerned with Booker's consequences. For a short critique of the logic behind 
Booker's remedial holding, see Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 665, 677-80 (2006). 
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course, the instruction that judges treat the Guidelines as "advi­
sory" does little to clarify how the Guidelines should advise. 
Hence, the Court further instructed that appellate courts should re­
view sentences for "reasonableness,"25 and that such determina­
tions should be guided by the broad purposes of sentencing 
outlined in § 3553(a) of the federal sentencing statute.26 
At least on paper, this third act of our sentencing drama ap­
pears to herald a rebirth of judicial discretion. The Guidelines are 
no longer mandatory, and judges are more free to fashion punish­
ments they deem to be reasonable. Yet, this new emancipatory 
doctrine of "reasonableness" remains in complex, perhaps schizo­
phrenic, tension with the advisory nature of the Guidelines. In­
deed, Booker has spawned many questions yet to be worked out: 
What does it mean for the Guidelines to be "advisory"? Upon 
which factors should sentencing judges rely? What does appellate 
"reasonableness" review entail? And finally, in this new sentencing 
regime, what is the proper balance between legislative control, ad­
ministrative expertise, appellate oversight, and judicial discretion? 
To these questions, Booker gives few answers. Hence, in the wake 
of Booker, the "advisory" Guidelines, "reasonableness" review, 
and § 3553(a) converge into what can best be considered a nascent 
common law of sentencing. Naturally, the courts are now straining 
to fashion rules to govern this new sentencing regime-to distill 
Booker's vague aspirations into concrete reality. 
B. Booker's Results 
Before pondering the emerging post-Booker rules more fully, 
let us take a brief detour to examine Booker's early results. One 
may reasonably question whether Booker's transformation of fed­
eral sentencing doctrine has translated into any real changes in sen­
tencing outcomes on the ground. Yet, with respect to crack and 
cocaine sentencing, Booker does appear to have had an impact. In­
deed, the impact of Booker has been felt more noticeably in crack 
sentencing than in other areas. 
The Sentencing Commission's March 2006 report on the im­
pact of Booker provides the latest comprehensive data on post­
25. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
26. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a) (2000). 
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Booker sentencing trends.27 Based on analysis of all sentences is­
sued in the year following Booker, the Commission reported that 
judges issued non-government-sponsored,28 below-Guidelines 
sentences in 12.5 percent of cases and above-Guidelines sentences 
in 1.6 percent of cases.29 This represents a significant increase in 
non-Guidelines sentencing compared to the period directly preced­
ing Booker. In the year prior to Booker, judges were able to depart 
from the Guidelines in extraordinary cases,3° but they used this au­
thority to issue below-Guidelines sentences in only 5.8 percent of 
cases31 and above-Guidelines sentences in 0.8 percent of cases.32 
Of course, these numbers suggest something far short of a revolu­
tion, but they are not insignificant either. Booker has more than 
doubled the percentage of cases in which judges are using their dis­
cretion to issue sentences not advised by the Guidelines. 
Most importantly for the issue at hand, the post-Booker expan­
sion in judicial discretion has had even more marked consequences 
in the area of crack sentencing. The Commission's report observes 
that post-Booker crack sentencing trends are "consistent with those 
of the other major drug types,"33 and it concludes that "[c]ourts do 
not often appear to be using Booker ... to impose below-range 
sentences in crack cocaine cases."34 However, the Commission's 
conclusion paints with too broad a brush. According to the Com­
mission's own data, the percentage of crack cases in which judges 
have given non-government sponsored below-Guidelines sentences 
has increased from 4.3 percent before Booker to 14.7 percent after 
27. U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 62 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER RE­
PORT], available at http://www.ussc.govlbooker_reportIBookecReport.pdf. 
28. I have chosen to leave out government-sponsored § 5K1.1 substantial assis­
tance departures. These are not directly relevant to the issue at hand, since below­
Guidelines sentences in these cases are more a function of prosecutorial discretion than 
judicial discretion. Here, we are concerned only with Booker's impact on judges' sen­
tencing behavior, not on the behavior of prosecutors. 
29. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 62. 
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
31. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 57 (noting a 6.7 percentage point 
increase since Booker). 
32. See id. at 58. 
33. Id. at 126. 
34. Id. at 111. Activists with a stake in preventing congressional overreaction 
have also downplayed the impact of Booker. See Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Sen­
tencing with Discretion: Crack Cocaine Sentencing After Booker, THE SENTENCING PRO­
JECT 7 (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.orglpdfs/crackcocaine-after 
booker.pdf ("These trends do not suggest a seismic shift in federal sentencing, and seem 
more illustrative of 'business as usual. "'). 
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Booker.35 The percentage of such sentences in powder cocaine 
cases has also increased from 4.2 percent before Booker to 10.8 per­
cent after Booker.36 Notably, in exercising their Booker discretion, 
judges seem to be somewhat more likely to give below-Guidelines 
sentences in crack cases than in powder cases. Before Booker, 
downward departure rates for crack and powder offenses were 
roughly identical (4.2 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively);37 after 
Booker, judges appear to be giving below-Guidelines sentences at a 
rate four percentage points higher in crack cases than in powder 
cases (14.7 percent and 10.8 percent).38 This is undoubtedly a 
curious development, and one that has gone unnoticed by the Com­
mission. Hence, although the percentage of below-Guidelines 
sentences has increased overall, it has increased more so for crack 
defendants, and judges are more likely to give below-Guidelines 
sentences to crack defendants than to powder defendants. This is a 
new phenomenon that has emerged in the wake of Booker. 
Since Booker, judges have issued below-Guidelines sentences 
in 610 crack cases,39 and most of these sentences have been based 
on individualized sentencing rationales.40 However, judges in a sig­
nificant number of cases have cited their disagreements with the 
100:1 ratio as a reason to give below-Guidelines sentences. Judges 
have done so in at least thirty-five cases,41 and ten of these judges 
have issued published opinions justifying their decisions.42 In these 
35. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 126-28. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. at 128 tb1.20; infra fig.1. 
38. See Figs. 1 & 2. 
39. BOOKER REpORT, supra note 27, at 130. 
40. See id. at 82 (listing various rationales that have been cited by judges). 
41. Id. at 131. In an additional seventy-three cases, the crack-powder disparity 
may have been a factor, but the sentencing courts' references to "disparity" were too 
vague to know for sure. Id. Since there have been a total of 5,112 crack cases since 
Booker, this amounts to between 0.7 percent and 2.1 percent of all crack cases. Id. at 
128. 
42. United States v. Hamilton, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (reduced 
from 70-87 months to 36 months); United States v. Stukes, No.3 CR. 601 (RWS), 2005 
WL 2560244 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,2005) (20:1; reduced from 46-57 months to 33 months); 
United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (10:1; reduced from 295­
353 months to 211 months); United States v. Castillo, No.3 CR. 835 (RWS), 2005 WL 
1214280 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005) (20:1; reduced from 135-168 months to 87 months) 
(government's appeal to Second Circuit pending); United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 
2005 WL 1076243 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (no explicit ratio; reduced from 235-293 
months to 156 months); United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (no explicit ratio; reduced from 360 months-life to 204 months); Simon v. United 
States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (10:1 or 20:1; reduced from 324-405 months 
to 262 months); United States v. Harris, No. 04-0157 (JR), 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3958 
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ten cases with published opinions, judges have generally chosen to 
replace the 100:1 ratio with their own 20:1 or 10:1 ratios when calcu­
lating sentences. This has resulted in an average sentence reduction 
of thirty-five percent below the minimum sentence advised by the 
Guidelines.43 In contrast, other judges have disagreed, refusing to 
impose a below-Guidelines sentence based on the 100:1 ratio.44 
Moreover, eight circuits have also weighed in. Two have permitted 
judges to abandon the ratio,45 while six have overturned district 
judges' decisions to impose below-Guidelines sentences based on 
categorical rejection of the 100:1 ratio.46 In sum, a growing differ­
ence of opinion is emerging in the district and circuit courts over 
the 100:1 ratio, but the issue still remains in its infancy. 
II. COCAINE SENTENCING AND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES 
The preceding discussion has provided a snapshot of the doctri­
nal and practical changes Booker has wrought. Booker has given 
judges a measure of freedom from the constraints of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, yet this new authority remains precarious and perhaps 
even illusory. The contours of the new sentencing regime will de­
pend on how the courts come to understand Booker's standard of 
"reasonableness." Nevertheless, judges do appear to be using their 
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005); United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005) 
(20:1 ratio; reduced from 41-51 months to 18 months); see also United States v. Nellum, 
No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005) (citing unfairness of ratio, 
but justifying lower sentence based on unrelated individualized factors) (no explicit ra­
tio; reduced from 168-210 months to 108 months). 
43. Note that statutory mandatory minimums create a floor below which judges 
cannot reach. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2006); United 
States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Neb. 2005). 
45. United States v. Pickett, 2007 WL 445937 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). 
46. See United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Jointer, 457 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pho, 433 
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2006). Addition­
ally, three circuits have refused to find the ratio presumptively unreasonable. See 
United States v. Esperance, 165 Fed. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United 
States v. Lister, 432 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United 
States v. Thomas, 158 Fed. App'x 623 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (pre-Booker sen­
tence does not constitute plain error, since alleged unfairness of the crack sentencing 
ratio is insufficient reason to believe district court would have imposed a lower sentence 
post-Booker). This follows a general trend in which many circuits have concluded that 
within-Guidelines sentences should be accorded a presumption of reasonableness. 
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 27 (collecting cases). 
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new discretion in the context of cocaine sentencing, and this has 
resulted in more below-Guidelines sentences in crack cases than in 
powder cases. Many of these judges have based their below-Guide­
lines crack sentences on individualized sentencing rationales. Nev­
ertheless, a significant group of others have explicitly issued below­
Guidelines sentences for the primary reason that they disagree with 
the 100:1 Guidelines ratio. 
This Part will examine the debate over the 100:1 ratio more 
closely, providing a brief history of cocaine sentencing policy and 
discussing the main objections to the 100:1 ratio. It will then discuss 
how many judges have treated the 100:1 ratio in the wake of 
Booker, and how their "substantive reasonableness" approach fails 
to resolve the issue. 
A. The Cocaine Controversy 
The crack-powder sentencing disparity has been controversial 
since crack first materialized. While cocaine had been present in 
America since the turn of the century, crack emerged in the late 
1970s and spread rapidly to America's major cities by the early 
1980s.47 Crack is a form of cocaine typically made by dissolving 
powder cocaine in water, adding baking soda, and then heating and 
drying the mixture until it forms small crystals.48 The user smokes 
these crystals and inhales the evaporating fumes in a manner that 
most quickly and efficiently delivers cocaine to the brain. Crack 
produces a short, intense feeling of euphoria that is highly 
addictive.49 
Due to its addictiveness and low price, crack use skyrocketed 
in the 1980s, and inner-city gangs fought turf wars for control over 
lucrative crack distribution networks. 50 Hence, responding to pub­
lic outcry over what had come to be perceived as a "crack epi­
demic," Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.51 The 
Act established harsh mandatory minimum sentences for serious 
drug offenders, and in so doing, it enshrined in statute a "100:1" 
47. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 32, 36 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT], available 
at hup:llwww.ussc.gov/crack/chap1-4.pdf. 
48. Id. at 14. By this method, one gram of powder cocaine will produce approxi­
mately 0.89 grams of crack. Id. 
49. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the JOO:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine 
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1260 (1996). 
50. Id. at 1243-44. 
51. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codi­
fied at 21 U.S.c. § 841(a) (2000)). 
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sentencing ratio for cocaine offenses. The resulting mandatory 
minimum scheme tied sentence length to drug quantity and treated 
offenses involving one gram of crack cocaine as severely as one 
hundred grams of powder cocaine.52 When the Sentencing Com­
mission created its first set of Guidelines the following year, it al­
igned cocaine sentences with the drug quantity ratio established in 
Congress's mandatory minimums.53 
The sentencing differential between crack and powder cocaine 
was justified on a variety of grounds, including crack's greater ad­
dictiveness, its association with other serious crimes, its low price 
and ease of manufacture, and its harsher physiological effects.54 
But the sentencing ratio soon came under fire. Critics argued that 
it unduly targeted low-level dealers, that there is little pharmacolog­
ical difference between crack and powder cocaine, and that the ra­
tio had a disparate impact on African-Americans.55 Defendants 
challenged the cocaine ratio in the courts on equal protection 
grounds, but no appellate court was willing to strike it down.56 
However, in response to public criticism, Congress asked the 
Sentencing Commission to investigate the crack-powder ratio and 
propose possible modifications.57 In 1995, the Commission issued 
its report concluding that although "crack cocaine poses greater 
harms to society than does powder cocaine" and thus "may warrant 
higher penalties," the specific 100:1 quantity ratio "should be re­
examined and revised. "58 Although the report did not propose a 
different quantity ratio, the Commission proposed amended Guide­
52. Under the two-tiered mandatory minimum scheme, trafficking in five to forty­
nine grams of crack, or 500 to 4,999 grams of powder cocaine, results in a five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence; trafficking in fifty or more grams of crack, or 5,000 or 
more grams of powder cocaine, results in a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21 
U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) to (iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) to (iii). 
53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2D1.1 cmt. (not­
ing need to coordinate sentencing guidelines with mandatory minimums). 
54. See 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at 117-18. 
55. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1288-99 (1995); Spade, supra note 49, at 1266-68. 
56. See United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 733 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 92 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 96 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 64 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 329 
(6th Cir. 1997) (citing cases); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 751 (7th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dumas, 
64 F.3d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995). 
57. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103­
322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994). 
58. 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at xiii, 195, 197. 
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lines three months later that would have created identical sentences 
for crack and powder offenses.59 After holding hearings, however, 
Congress rejected the Commission's proposal and directed the 
Commission to recommend further alternatives to the 100:1 ratio 
that would punish crack offenses more severely than powder of­
fenses.6o In 1997, the Sentencing Commission issued a new report 
recommending that the ratio be reduced by simultaneously raising 
the crack quantity threshold and lowering the cocaine quantity 
threshold such that the result would be a 5:1 ratio.61 This touched 
off a flurry of proposals in Congress with a variety of ratios. Ulti­
mately, however, Congress could not find a consensus and chose 
not to amend the existing ratio. In 2001, the Judiciary Committee 
again asked the Sentencing Commission to recommend changes to 
the 100:1 ratio. This time, the Commission issued a new report sug­
gesting a 20:1 ratio.62 Congress held hearings on this new proposal, 
but it again did not reach a consensus to adopt it. 
The debate over the crack-powder ratio has too often been 
overheated and hyperbolic.63 Let us begin, then, with a clarifica­
tion. Some observers have erroneously taken the "100:1" ratio to 
mean that crack sentences are "100 times longer" than powder 
sentences.64 However, it is important to understand that the 
"100:1" ratio refers to drug quantity, not sentence lengths. Hence, 
the best way to comprehend the felt disparity of the quantity ratio is 
to hold quantity constant and compare the sentence lengths that 
59. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts; No­
tice, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,076 (May 10, 1995). 
60. H. REP. No. 104-272, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337. 
61. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2, 5, 9 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT], available 
at http://www.ussC.gov!r30ngressINEWCRACK.PDF. 
62. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED­
ERAL SENTENCING POLICY 107 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT], available at http:// 
www.ussc.gov/ccongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf. 
63. Representative Maxine Waters, a leading member of the Congressional Black 
Caucus, has accused the CIA of starting the crack epidemic, as part of a plot to fund the 
Nicaraguan Contras. Spade, supra note 49, at 1244. Reverend Jesse Jackson has de­
cried the crack-powder ratio, declaring, "It's racist, it's ungodly, it must change." /d. at 
1276. On the other side of the issue, Senator Paula Hawkins, speaking in favor of the 
1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, said, "Drugs pose a clear and present danger to America's 
national security .... This is a bill which has far-reaching impact on the future of civili­
zation as we know it." 132 CONGo REC. 26,436 (1986)_ 
64. See, e.g., Nkechi Taifa, The "Crack/Powder" Disparity: Can the International 
Race Convention Provide a Basis for Relief!, AM. CONST. Soc. L. & POL., May 2006, at 
2, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Crack_Powder_Cocaine_Disparity.pdf (de­
scribing crack penalties as "one hundred times more severe" than powder penalties). 
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result from the Guidelines algorithm. Making these conversions, 
the 100:1 drug quantity ratio translates into a sentence length ratio 
that varies from roughly 8:1 to 1:1. The ratio is smallest at the high 
and low ends of the Offense Level (i.e., quantity) spectrum, and the 
ratio also gets smaller as the Criminal History Score increases.65 
The median ratio is roughly 3:1, but the ratio is larger for quantity 
amounts in the middle of the spectrum (quantities between four 
and 300 grams).66 
Clarification aside, a 3:1 real sentence differential is quite large 
and no less deserving of the criticism it has endured. Yet, it remains 
important-and will be particularly important to the argument of 
this Article-to articulate precisely why the cocaine ratio is prob­
lematic. Unfortunately, much of the debate has tended to focus on 
two red herrings, thereby failing to reach the heart of the problem. 
The first of these red herrings is the argument that crack and pow­
der cocaine are indistinguishable substances, since the active ingre­
dient in each is cocaine alkaloid.67 The powder and crack varieties 
simply allow for different delivery mechanisms of the same active 
ingredient. However, while this observation may be formally true, 
it obscures real and serious functional differences between the 
drugs. Powder cocaine can be snorted, ingested, or injected; crack 
can only be smoked. These different methods of use affect how 
quickly and efficiently the cocaine reaches the bloodstream, and 
thus they control the drug's degree of impact on the body. The 
Sentencing Commission explained, "The risk and severity of addic­
tion to cocaine is directly related to the method by which the drug is 
administered into the body .... Smoking ... produces the quickest 
onset, shortest duration, and most intense effects, and therefore 
produces the greatest risk of addiction."68 This difference in man­
ner of use makes crack inherently more addictive than powder, de­
spite the same active ingredient.69 
Crack differs from powder in additional ways. Dose-for-dose, 
the street price of crack is much lower than powder, and the profit 
65. Indeed, the Commission itself has pointed out the perversity of this result. 
See 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 99-100. 
66. These ratios are based on the author's calculations, based on data in the U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, at 133-39, 376. See infra figs.3 & 4. 
67. 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at 12. 
68. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 93. Crack has been estimated to put users at a 
fifty times greater risk of addiction than powder. Spade, supra note 49, at 1262. 
69. If powder cocaine is injected, it does put the user at similar risk of addictive­
ness as smoking crack. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 93-94. However, only 2.8 per­
cent of powder cocaine users inject it. Id. 
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margins for dealers are much higher.70 This makes crack a more 
lucrative business for street gangs and organized crime.?l It also 
makes crack more likely to prey on the most vulnerable poor and 
young users. To the extent drug policy should be based on deter­
rence rationales, a cheaper and more lucrative drug demands stiffer 
penalties to discourage dealing and use. Moreover, although social 
scientists do not all agree, many scholars-and many more anecdo­
tal observers-have noted the unique damage crack has inflicted on 
communities through its association with violent crime and other 
forms of criminality and child neglectJ2 For example, one study 
found that 60 percent of drug-related New York City homicides in 
1988 were due to crack.73 Another recent study has found that 
crack is associated with a 5 percent increase in overall violent and 
property crime between 1984 and 1989.74 
The second red herring in the debate over the 100:1 ratio is the 
argument that the ratio punishes African-Americans more harshly 
than other groups. Crack is often thought of as a "black drug," and 
powder cocaine is considered a "white drug." Eighty-five percent 
of federal crack offenders are African-American, whereas 69 per­
cent of powder cocaine offenders are white or Hispanic.?5 The har­
sher penalties for crack have been a major reason for the 
disproportionately large African-American prison population. This 
fact has led to cries of "racism,"76 and also more sophisticated ob­
jections based on "disproportionate impact."77 
However, these objections to the 100:1 ratio only see half of 
the picture. They fail to account for the enormous damage crack 
does to African-American communities. Indeed, a recent study has 
found that crack contributed substantially to homicide rates of Afri­
can-American males and that crack explains much of the observed 
70. Like any kind of product innovation, consumers and producers of crack share 
in the surplus created by a more efficient drug. 
71. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 85-87, 89-90. 
72. See id. at 93-109 (summarizing various research findings). 
73. Id. at 96. 
74. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et aI., Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine 6-7 (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11318, 2005), available at http://price 
theory.uchicago.edu/levittlPaperslFryerHeatonLevittMurphy2OOS.pdf. Although the 
study observes that the link between crack and crime is less apparent in the 1990s, it 
attributes this in part to the "declining profitability of crack distribution." Id. at 7. The 
magnitude and likelihood of penalties for distribution are a key factor in profitability. 
75. Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack:Powder Disparity-The Data 
Tell Us that it is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT'O REP. 87, 89 (2003). 
76. See Taifa, supra note 64, at 1. 
77. Sklansky, supra note 55, at 1289-90. 
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increases in low birth weight babies, fetal death, child mortality, 
and unwed births in African-American communities.78 In contrast, 
crack has had no apparent effect on these variables for white com­
munities.79 Hence, lower penalties and less enforcement for crack 
offenses might arguably treat African-American drug dealers more 
"equally," but such leniency would inflict a disparate negative im­
pact on the innocent African-American communities the dealers 
victimize. Protecting victims of crime is a ·basic duty owed by the 
state to all communities, and indeed one way in which racism his­
torically oppressed African-Americans was by denying them this 
important right.80 It would be a perverse kind of racial justice that 
abandoned protection of the majority of law-abiding African­
Americans in the name of leniency for their African-American vic­
timizers. As one African-American scholar has aptly put it, "we 
ought to commend rather than condemn the legislature's distinction 
between crack and powdered cocaine."81 He explained, "If it is 
true that blacks as a class are disproportionately victimized by the 
conduct punished by the statute at issue, then it follows that blacks 
as a class may be helped by measures reasonably thought to dis­
courage such conduct."82 
David Sklansky, a prominent critic of the 100:1 ratio, replies to 
this objection to the disparate impact theory by arguing that the 
ratio's impact on African-American defendants must be viewed in 
light of the public and legislative atmosphere in which the 100:1 
ratio was born.83 Sklansky characterizes this atmosphere as 
78. Fryer et aI., supra note 74, at 6. 
79. Id. 
80. African-American legal scholar Regina Austin has observed, "Drive-by 
shootings and random street crime have replaced lynchings as a source of intimidation, 
and the 'culture of terror' practiced by armed crack dealers and warring adolescents has 
turned them into the urban equivalents of the Ku Klux Klan." Regina Austin, "The 
Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1769, 1772 (1992). Another scholar echoes the point: 
Racially invidious under-enforcement purposefully denies African-American 
victims of violence the things that all persons legitimately expect from the 
state: civil order and, in the event that crimes are committed, best efforts to 
apprehend and punish offenders. For most of the nation's history, blacks were 
denied this public good. . .. In many contexts, in comparison to the treatment 
accorded to whites, blacks have been denied quite literally the equal protec­
tion of the law. 
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 
107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1267-68 (1994) (citations omitted). 
81. Kennedy, supra note 80, at 1269. 
82. Id. 
83. See Ski an sky, supra note 55, at 1300. 
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"tinged" with racial stereotyping.84 He also argues that the 100:1 
ratio emerged because whites were worried about the spread of 
crack, a "black drug," into white communities.85 However, while 
Sklansky's evidence of stereotyping is not conclusive, it is also irrel­
evant. Even if crack was widely considered a "black drug" associ­
ated with black communities, the 100:1 ratio can be seen as a 
welcome effort by Congress to solve a "black problem." Moreover, 
if the 100:1 ratio was instead a reaction to the spread of crack into 
white communities, Congress would be guilty not of creating the 
100:1 ratio, but rather of failing to create it sooner than it did. In 
any case, conscious and unconscious motivations with regard to 
race can be very difficult to discern. Instead of such speculation, we 
are better off taking legislators at their word-and thus understand­
ing the 100:1 ratio as an attempt to stop the destruction crack was 
inflicting on the most vulnerable communities. In the words of 
Florida Representative E. Clay Shaw, one of the sponsors of the 
1986 Act which created the 100:1 ratio, "[I]n Dade County, in 
Broward County, and Palm Beach County that I represent, and as a 
matter of fact right here in this Nation's Capital in the minority 
areas, they are saying come in and arrest the drug traffickers, get 
them out of our neighborhood."86 
Unfortunately, fixation upon the two red herrings discussed 
above has served to confuse and obscure a much more powerful 
argument against the 100:1 ratio. When Congress passed the Anti­
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, it explicitly aimed to target "serious" and 
"major" drug traffickers more harshly than small-time dealers.87 
Indeed, this was the purpose behind the Act's new two-tiered 
mandatory minimum scheme, which tied mandatory minimums to 
drug quantity.88 In Senator Robert Byrd's words, the ten-year min­
imum was for "the kingpins-the masterminds who are really run­
ning these operations," the five-year minimum was for "the middle­
84. Id. at 1291-94 (describing the legislative atmosphere); id. at 1300-01 (defend­
ing the disparate impact theory); see also id. at 1292 ("[T]he drug of primary concern 
was strongly associated in the white public mind with a particular racial minority."). 
85. [d. at 1295. 
86. 141 CONGo REc. 28,357 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Shaw). Others prefer not to 
take such legislators at their word. Representative Maxine Waters caustically replied to 
Shaw, "I do not want [Representative Shaw] to ever believe that he cares more about 
my community than 1 do. 1 do not want the gentleman to think that somehow his 
policies and his beliefs are right for my community." Id. (statement of Rep. Waters). 
So much for the idea of the "public interest." 
87. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000». 
88. See id. 
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level dealers," and quantities below the level that would trigger the 
minimums were reserved for low-level dealers and users.89 Ironi­
cally, however, Congress's simultaneous zeal to get tough on crack 
offenders entirely undermined this broader effort to single out 
high-level traffickers for harsher punishment. The 100:1 ratio ig­
nores the realities of drug distribution networks, where low-level 
dealers and users are more likely than higher-level traffickers to 
feel the hammer of crack sentences.90 In practice, the broad goal of 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the narrow goal of the Act's 100:1 
ratio work at cross-purposes, and the 100:1 ratio has managed to 
swallow the fundamental retributive and deterrent aims of the Act. 
According to the Sentencing Commission's 1995 report, "crack 
cocaine offenders differ characteristically (e.g., smaller range of ac­
tivity, less likely to be characterized as performing important func­
tions) from other drug offenders at the higher penalty levels. "91 
According to the Commission's data, the majority (59.6 percent) of 
convicted crack offenders were low-level dealers while low-level 
dealers composed a minority (31.2 percent) of powder offenders.92 
Indeed, a more recent Commission report suggests that the percent­
age of convicted crack offenders with a low-level role has increased 
to 66.5 percent.93 High-level traffickers tend to deal in powder co­
caine, and then distribute it to lower-level dealers who convert it to 
crack prior to selling it. Hence, the 100:1 ratio effectively punishes 
the lower end of the distribution network more severely than the 
higher end. The ratio has created a system that gives the least seri­
ous punishment to the most serious offender and the most serious 
punishment to the least serious offender. One would be hard 
pressed to find a more perfect way to frustrate the goals of just 
punishment and effective deterrence. 
The perversity of the 100:1 ratio emerges even more clearly 
when we take a concrete look at the economics of drug distribution. 
Crack tends to be sold on the street in small, single-dose quantities 
of roughly 250 milligrams per dose.94 According to data from the 
89. 132 CONGo REC. 14,300 (1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd). The House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime also echoed Senator Byrd's sentiments. See Spade, supra note 
49, at 1253. 
90. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 99. 
91. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 193. 
92. Id. at 172 tbl.18. 
93. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 38 fig.5. 
94. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 85. Quantities and prices can vary widely. 
The author's calculations are based on numbers in the middle of the ranges reported by 
the Commission. 
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early 1990s, this "dime bag" would sell for roughly $10.95 In con­
trast, powder cocaine tends to be sold in larger five-to-ten dose 
units of roughly one gram each, at a price around $85 per unit.96 
Comparing the sentences of low-level crack and powder cocaine 
dealers with each other reveals a sizeable, but not outrageous, dis­
parity. Assuming he is a first-time offender, a low-level dealer 
caught with enough powder to make five one-gram sales would re­
ceive a Guidelines sentence of ten to sixteen months.97 That same 
offender caught with enough crack for five equivalent 250-milli­
gram sales would receive a Guidelines sentence of twenty-seven to 
thirty-three months. In this example, the offenders have equally 
culpable roles in the drug network, but the crack dealer's sentence 
is almost three times as long. Some may consider this unfair, and 
others may believe it reflects the relative social harms caused by the 
two drugs. But now let us compare low-level crack dealers with 
high-level powder dealers. Imagine a drug trafficker who distrib­
utes his 500 grams of powder cocaine to eighty-nine street-level 
dealers. After converting the powder into crack, each dealer will 
have roughly five grams of crack, which will enable him to make 
twenty sales for a total of $200.98 The high-level trafficker will thus 
be responsible for 1,780 street sales of crack worth almost $18,000 
and sold by eighty-nine different dealers. For this crime, the high­
level trafficker would receive a Guidelines sentence of sixty-three 
to seventy-eight months. However, since they converted the pow­
der into crack, each of the eighty-nine low-level dealers would re­
ceive an identical sixty-three to seventy-eight-month sentence. 
Under the 100:1 ratio, these minor street dealers are treated as 
harshly as the major kingpin. 
One final example will suffice to drive home the point. In an 
actual case, two low-level dealers purchased 225 grams of powder 
cocaine from a higher-level supplier.99 When they converted the 
powder into crack, they were disappointed to discover that the 
powder yielded only eighty-eight grams, rather than the typical 200. 
They complained to their supplier, and he agreed to trade the de­
fective crack for a new 225-gram batch of powder. When the two 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2Dl.l(c), at 133­
39 (offense levels); id. at 376 (sentencing table). 
98. This assumes a cocaine-crack conversion rate of 0.89. See supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
99. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 193-94. 
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dealers returned to the supplier with their eighty-eight grams of 
crack, they were arrested before they could complete the trade. 
The supplier was subsequently arrested for selling the original 225 
grams of powder. Although the supplier and the dealers were all 
first-time offenders, the supplier received a thirty-three to forty­
one-month sentence while the lower-level dealers each received a 
121 to 151-month sentence.loo 
In sum, the 100:1 ratio often treats low-level crack offenders as 
severely as, and sometimes even more severely than, high-level 
powder offenders. Moreover, high-level drug offenders are, gener­
ally, more likely to deal in powder than in crack. The ratio is 
plainly bad policy. Some difference between crack and powder 
sentences may be justified by the unique harms inflicted by crack. 
However, the 100:1 ratio corrects a disparity in harm at the price of 
creating a much greater disparity in culpability. The 100:1 ratio 
may not be so problematic for sentencing higher-level crack offend­
ers, but in cases involving low-level dealers or users of crack, it seri­
ously thwarts the aims of fair and just punishment. 
B. Substantive Reasonableness 
As thus far shown, the 100:1 ratio can, in some instances, pro­
duce perverse and unfair results. However, the chief flaw in the 
ratio stems not from the pharmacological similarity of crack and 
powder, nor from the ratio's disparate racial impact, but rather 
from a deeper source. The 100:1 ratio distorts the justice system's 
ability to assign punishment on the basis of culpability and just 
deserts. Recognizing this reality, though also indulging other argu­
ments against the ratio, the Sentencing Commission has proposed 
that the ratio be reduced to 20:1, 10:1, or even 5:1.101 A smaller 
ratio would recognize the unique harm inflicted by crack, but it 
would limit the ratio's tendency to distort punishment based on cul­
pability. Congress, however, has yet to take the Commission's 
advice. 
What then, in the wake of Booker, should judges do? When 
sentencing a crack defendant, should judges apply the 100:1 Guide­
lines ratio, or should they venture away from it on their own? 
When faced with this question, the first instinct of many judges has 
been to think in terms of "substantive reasonableness." The 
Booker Court made the Guidelines "advisory" and required judges 
100. Id. 

10l. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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to impose "reasonable" sentences in accord with the dictates of 
§ 3553(a). Under § 3553(a), courts must consider a list of more 
than ten factors, including the applicable Guidelines range,102 "the 
nature and circumstances of the offense,"103 the need for the sen­
tence imposed to "reflect the seriousness of the offense,"l04 the 
need for the sentence to be "sufficient, but not greater than neces­
sary,"105 and the need for the sentence to "afford adequate deter­
rence."106 However, most relevant to the question of the 100:1 
ratio is § 3553(a)(6), which requires judges to consider "the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with sim­
ilar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."107 
Through the lens of substantive reasonableness, judges have asked 
themselves what sentence, based on the 100:1 ratio or a different 
ratio, will best avoid "unwarranted disparity." 
1. Two Reasonable Approaches? 
In the wake of Booker, § 3553(a)(6)'s command to avoid dis­
parity has become the locus of concern for substantive discussion of 
the 100:1 ratio. Yet, § 3553(a)(6) lends itself to two radically differ­
ent conclusions. The first approach, which we might call the ex post 
view, points to the disparities created by the Guidelines ratio. Al­
though Booker and § 3553(a)(4)(A) require judges to "consider" 
the Guidelines, § 3553(a)(6) requires judges to independently con­
sider the issue of disparity.108 Hence, read most naturally, 
§ 3553(a) permits judges to consider disparity within the Guidelines 
and, thereby, weigh both § 3553(a) factors-the value of following 
the Guidelines against the value of eliminating the supposed dispar­
ity.109 As one judge explained, "The guideline'S [sic] treatment of 
crack cocaine versus their treatment of powder cocaine ... may, in 
102. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a)(4)(A) (2000). 
103. Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
104. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
105. Id. § 3553(a). 
106. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
107. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
108. Id. 
109. A close reading of § 3553(a), applying ordinary principles of statutory inter­
pretation, suggests that § 3553(a)(6) should not be construed to simply require adher­
ence to the Guidelines. Such an interpretation of § 3553(a)(6) would render 
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)'s instruction to consider the Guidelines entirely superfluous. See 
Michael M. Q'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627 (2006) [hereinafter Q'Hear, The Duty to 
Avoid Disparity]. 
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and of itself, create an unwarranted sentence disparity."llo In the 
words of another judge, this disparity exists "between defendants 
convicted of possessing powder cocaine and defendants convicted 
of possessing crack cocaine. "111 
Judges have also cited the 100:1 ratio's disparate racial impact 
as a source of unwarranted disparity. For example, one judge ob­
served, "Perhaps most troubling ... is that the unjustifiably harsh 
crack penalties disproportionately impact on black defendants."112 
Under this ex post approach, judges reason that the 100:1 ratio cre­
ates unwarranted disparity between a crack defendant and defend­
ants convicted of similar offenses (powder cocaine) or between 
defendants who differ because of their race. 113 Both rationales are 
consistent with § 3553(a)'s language, which refers both to the na­
ture of the defendant ("defendants with similar records") and the 
nature of his actions ("defendants ... who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct").H4 Judges cite these disparities and conclude 
that § 3553(a)(6) requires them to replace the 100:1 ratio with a 
different ratio, usually 20:1 or 10:l. 
However, other judges relying on the same provision have 
come to an opposite conclusion. Under this second approach, 
which we might call the ex ante view, judges focus on the forward­
looking impact of rejecting the 100:1 ratio and replacing it with a 
lower ratio. In this view, a judicial decision to categorically reject 
the 100:1 ratio creates a collective action problem. If every judge 
110. United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 
May 6, 2005) (imposing a 156-month sentence where the Guidelines recommended 235 
to 293 months). 
111. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 781 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (employing 
a 20:1 ratio and imposing an 18-month sentence where the Guidelines recommended 41 
to 51 months). 
112. Id. at 780. 
113. But cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5H1.10 
(Commission policy statement deeming race to be a factor "not relevant" to the deter­
mination of a sentence); 18 U.S.c. § 3553( a )(5) (requiring judges to consider "any perti­
nent policy statement" issued by the Commission). 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(b). Note that the reference to "conduct" rather than 
"offenses" can lend itself to finding similarity between two defendants convicted of 
different crimes whose "conduct" was nevertheless similar. But see O'Hear, The Duty 
to Avoid Disparity, supra note 109, at 641-42 (arguing, based on text and legislative 
history, that § 3553(a)(6) should be construed to refer only to disparities between de­
fendants with the same offense of conviction, but concluding that crack and powder 
offenses can be considered "similar crimes"). It should also be noted that § 3553(a)'s 
reference to "similar records" suggests that Congress probably had something narrower 
in mind than racially disparate impact. Although the disparate impact theory is plausi­
ble, it is not entirely convincing. 
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adopted the same smaller ratio, there would be no disparity. How­
ever, one judge's choice to categorically abandon the 100:1 ratio 
creates disparity between identical defendants, based simply on 
which judge a defendant happens to be assigned. As one sentenc­
ing judge explained his decision to abide by the 100:1 ratio, the 
choice of a different ratio "would in all likelihood create greater 
inter-court (and intra-court) sentencing disparity among federal of­
fenders with similar records who commit identical offenses-that is, 
among crack offenders."115 Echoing this sentiment, the Fourth Cir­
cuit observed that "by its plain language, § 3553(a)(6) seeks to 
bring about increased uniformity in the sentencing of similarly situ­
ated defendants," and this uniformity is frustrated by "giving a sen­
tencing court the authority to sentence a defendant based on its 
view of an appropriate ratio."116 
Moreover, the First Circuit pointed to another form of ex ante 
disparity that would result from judicial rejection of the 100:1 ratio. 
In contrast to the above inter-judge disparity, the existence of statu­
tory mandatory minimums based on the 100:1 ratio would create 
intra-judge disparities among defendants, regardless of whether 
they are sentenced by different judges. Since the five- and ten-year 
mandatory minimums reflect the 100:1 ratio, rejecting the ratio 
while abiding by the mandatory minimums would create a huge dis­
parity between defendants possessing quantities large enough to 
trigger the minimums and those possessing only a small amount 
less. For example, under the Guidelines, a first-time offender pos­
sessing 49 grams of crack would receive a sentence of 97 to 121 
months. An identical offender possessing 50 grams of crack, 
enough to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum, would receive 
a statutorily mandated 120-month sentence. If a judge rejects the 
100:1 ratio and instead applies a 20:1 ratio to the first offender, his 
sentence becomes 63 to 78 months. As the First Circuit observed, 
"a one-gram difference in drug quantity would create a huge sen­
tencing differential (nearly fifty percent)."117 
2. The Clash of Disparities 
The different conclusions reached by the ex post and ex ante 
views of the 100:1 ratio produce a veritable clash of disparities. Ju­
115. United States v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2006). 
116. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed 
(No. 05-11659 June 20, 2006). 
117. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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dicial critics and proponents of the ratio each have their own pet 
disparities, and each side can use its own disparities to rebut those 
of the other. The ex post critics of the 100:1 ratio point to dispari­
ties resulting from the ratio's treatment of similar offenses or of­
fenders in radically different ways. In this view, maintaining the 
100:1 ratio furthers drug type disparity and racial disparity. In con­
trast, the ex ante defenders of the 100:1 ratio point to disparities 
that would result from individual judges deciding to categorically 
treat a class of offenders more leniently than other judges would 
treat that class, or more leniently than the same judge would have 
to treat similar classes (e.g., those crack offenders subject to 
mandatory minimums). In this view, rejecting the 100:1 ratio cre­
ates inter-judge disparity and intra-judge disparity. Alas, neither 
the concept of disparity, nor the words and intent of § 3553(a)(6), 
can provide a rationale for choosing one kind of disparity over an­
other. With regard to the 100:1 ratio, § 3553(a)(6) has no determi­
native content. 
Standing alone, the concept of "unwarranted disparity" be­
comes either circular or incoherent. An unwarranted disparity re­
sults when two similar defendants are treated dissimilarly, but what 
counts as meaningful dissimilarities are those dissimilarities that are 
unwarranted. This is the circular version of "unwarranted dispar­
ity." Instead of making "unwarranted disparity" a criterion of it­
self, the incoherent version considers "disparity" to be modified by 
"unwarranted" and asks judges to somehow distinguish between 
"warranted" and "unwarranted" disparities. Indeed, this version 
seems to be what Congress intended when it drafted the statute. As 
explained in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, "The key 
word in discussing unwarranted sentence disparities is 'unwar­
ranted.' "118 While this is true enough, the incoherence results from 
the fact that § 3553(a)(6) supplies no criteria for determining what 
is and is not warranted; by itself, "warrantedness" is an incoherent 
criterion.119 Hence, to become coherent, the concept of disparity 
must find some external principle on which to rely. 
118. S. REP. No. 95-605, at 1161 (1977). 
119. Many scholars and judges have come to the same conclusion with respect to 
disparity, or its opposite, uniformity. See, e.g., Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 94 ("Disparity is 
a normative principle that necessarily encompasses a judgment about which characteris­
tics of the offense (or the offender) should matter and which characteristics should 
not."); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 105 ("The trouble begins when we move 
beyond this slogan [of unwarranted disparity] and ask what factors should be consid­
ered in deciding whether particular crimes and particular criminals are 'similar' or 'dis­
similar' ...."); Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal 
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Yet, searching for such a principle in § 3553(a)(6) feels like 
searching for water in an arid desert. Indeed, the legislative history 
of § 3553(a)(6) offers no more than a mirage, for it suggests that 
Congress had both ex post and ex ante disparity in mind when it 
wrote the statute. One Senate Judiciary Committee Report noted 
that the requirement to avoid unwarranted disparity establishes of­
fense and offender characteristics "as the principal determinants of 
whether two offenders' cases are so similar that a difference be­
tween their sentences should be considered a disparity."12o This 
echoes the ex post view. However, the same report noted, in refer­
ence to disparity, "The offender before [a particular judge] should 
not receive more favorable or less favorable treatment solely by vir­
tue of the sheer chance that he is to be sentenced by a particular 
judge. "121 This echoes the ex ante view. 
In short, the clash between ex post and ex ante views of crack 
sentencing disparity and the decision about which kind of disparity 
to avoid-drug type disparity, racial disparity, inter-judge disparity, 
or intra-judge disparity-cannot be resolved by the terms of 
§ 3553(a)(6) or its legislative history. One scholar has aptly com­
pared § 3553(a)(6)'s "uniformity ideal" to the old "rehabilitative 
ideal" that used to dominate the sentencing agenda.122 Like the 
older ideal, the new ideal "embraces great complexity and, indeed, 
encompasses widely different and even conflicting kinds of social 
policies."123 Moreover, any hope of turning to § 3553(a)'s other 
factors in search of a criterion for "unwarranted disparity" runs into 
even more indeterminacy. The ex post approach might further the 
need to consider the "nature and circumstances of the offense" 
(§ 3553(a)(1» and "provide just punishment" (§ 3553(a)(2)(A», 
Sentencing, 74 U. eIN. L. REV. 749 (2006) [hereinafter O'Hear, The Original Intent of 
Uniformity in Federal Sentencing] ("[U]niformity seeks to eliminate unwarranted sen­
tencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities. The problem lies in 
distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted."); Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of 
Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 ("[R]educing sentencing disparity 
... requires a coherent underlying theory of punishment, because disparity is not a self­
defining concept. "). 
120. S. REp. No. 95-605, at 1161. 
121. Id. at 893; see also S. REp. No. 98-225, at 161 (1983) ("Each sentence will be 
the result of careful consideration of the particular characteristics of the offense and the 
offender, rather than being dependent on the identity of the sentencing judge and the 
nature of his sentencing philosophy."). 
122. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, supra note 
119, at 791 (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: 
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 2 (1981)). 
123. Id. 
644 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:619 
but the ex ante approach might do a better job of taking the Guide­
lines into account (§ 3553(a)(4)), "promot[ing] respect for the law" 
(§ 3553(a)(2)(A)), and "afford[ing] adequate deterrence" 
(§ 3553(a)(2)(B)).n4 And neither approach will tell us what sen­
tence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" (§ 3553(a)), 
since we cannot yet define what is "necessary." Indeed, Judge Pos­
ner has observed the "indeterminate and interminable character of 
inquiry into the meaning and application of each of the 'philosophi­
cal' concepts in which section 3553(a) abounds."125 Through the 
lens of substantive reasonableness, neither § 3553(a)(6)'s command 
to avoid disparity nor the rest of § 3553(a)'s grab bag of sentencing 
factors can adequately resolve the crack-powder issue. 
III. BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES 
At this point it is helpful to pause and remember Alexander 
Bickel's quip, "no answer is what the wrong question begets."126 
As observed in the previous Part, the substantive approach to the 
crack-powder issue leads to analytical gridlock. In this Part, I ex­
plore a more promising path. 
A. Structural Reasonableness 
Substantive reasonableness asked, "What is the correct sen­
tence for this defendant?" In contrast, structural reasonableness 
asks a more elementary question: "Who should make particular 
kinds of decisions related to sentencing?" The substantive ap­
proach focused on the "what" and "why"; the structural approach 
focuses on the "who" and "how."127 This distinction may seem sub­
124. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a) (2000). 
125. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005). 
126. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 103 (2d ed. 1986). 
127. Some appellate courts have recognized a distinction between "substantive" 
and "procedural" reasonableness review. The former relates to the actual quantum of 
the sentence given, and the latter usually refers to the duty to calculate the applicable 
guidelines range or consult § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 
383-85 (6th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 16621 (6th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc); United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 n.3 (6th CiT. 2006). As explained in 
the previous Part, my conception of "substantive reasonableness" encompasses both of 
those kinds of review. Hence, the use of the term "structural reasonableness" to distin­
guish something different-the need to consider the nature of the decision and the deci­
sion-maker in the sentencing calculus. My concept of "structural reasonableness" also 
differs from how another scholar has conceptualized sentencing reasonableness. Eric 
Citron, United States v. Pho: Reasons and Reasonableness in Post-Booker Appellate 
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 2183 (2006). In that article, the author distinguishes between 
645 2007] BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES 
tle or semantic, but it has significant consequences as to how judges 
think about sentencing. The dominance of the substantive ap­
proach in the wake of Booker, particularly among district court 
judges, should not be surprising. Prior to Booker, most of the struc­
tural questions had already been answered by Congress or the Sen­
tencing Commission, through narrowly circumscribed judicial 
discretion and sharply delineated permissible and impermissible 
reasons for Guidelines departures.128 However, in the wake of 
Booker, our evolving reasonableness regime demands renewed en­
gagement with the basic structural questions at the heart of the sen­
tencing process. Indeed, it demands heightened engagement since 
trial judges and appellate courts have taken on new obligations as 
stewards of the entire system's "reasonableness." A complete reck­
oning of post-Booker structural questions lies beyond the scope of 
this ArticleP9 However, this Part will attempt to elaborate and ap­
ply the structural perspective as it relates to the crack-powder issue. 
Two recent scholars have observed, "the sentencing decision is 
properly viewed as a series of decisions-each of which is impor­
tantly different from the others and each of which can best be per­
formed by a decisionmaker with certain qualities."13o In contrast to 
"reasonable-length" review and "reasons-based" review, arguing that review of 
sentences under Booker should be based "not on the terms imposed but on the reasons 
given for imposing them." Id. at 2184. However, the author does not address the ques­
tion central to this Article: In crack sentencing, which reasons should count and why? 
The author argues that reasonableness review should be about "reasons," rather than 
merely about sentence lengths. While my concept of reasonableness review encom­
passes this insight, I go further by arguing that certain kinds of reasons (structural ones) 
should take precedence over other kinds of reasons (substantive ones). 
128. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
129. One relevant and particularly important structural issue to which the appel­
late courts have indeed given some attention involves the question of what role the 
"advisory" Guidelines play in a determination of "reasonableness." Most circuits have 
held that Guidelines sentences should be accorded a "presumption of reasonableness," 
but at least one circuit has deemed a Guidelines sentence to be unreasonable. Compare 
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that guidelines sentences 
are presumptively reasonable), with United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 933 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that a guidelines sentence was unreasonable, since "a number of 
circumstances make this case highly unusual"). Two recent scholars have also at­
tempted to grapple with the structural question head-on. However, unlike this Article, 
they work at a very high level of abstraction and their analysis yields few concrete 
doctrinal or practical results. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing 
Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1124 (2005). Robinson and Spellman build a valuable foundation, but I believe struc­
tural issues may be more profitably explored through engagement with actual sentenc­
ing disputes. Cf Webb, 403 F.3d at 383 ("[W]e believe it prudent to permit a 
clarification of [reasonableness] concepts to evolve on a case-by-case basis."). 
130. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 129, at 1128. 
646 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:619 
the substantive issue of "unwarranted disparity," the key structural 
issue in cocaine sentencing is whether judges should categorically 
alter the 100:1 crack-powder ratio-that is, whether the question of 
the proper ratio is best resolved by Congress or the judiciary. A 
judge's sentence in crack cases really involves two different deci­
sions-a policy judgment about the appropriate categorical ratio to 
apply and an individualized judgment about the particular of­
fender's unique culpability.131 In this Part, I seek to disentangle 
these two different sentencing decisions, and I argue that policy de­
cisions are better left to Congress while individualized decisions 
should rest with the sentencing judge. In concrete terms, this 
means that structural reasonableness requires judges to abide by 
the 100:1 ratio but permits them to deviate from the Guidelines in 
individual cases where they find that the defendant's lesser culpa­
bility warrants deviation. 
In requiring adherence to the 100:1 ratio, a number of courts 
have appealed to the notion that determining the proper ratio be­
tween crack and powder sentences is a "policy judgment" better left 
to the legislature. As one sentencing judge lamented, "I should de­
fer to the choice of penalties that Congress has made for crack co­
caine even though I would quickly do something different if it were 
within my proper role to choose."132 Although relying mostly on 
substantive arguments about disparity, the Fourth Circuit also ob­
served that "sentencing courts should not be in the business of mak­
ing legislative judgments concerning crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine."133 Finally, the First Circuit has given the loudest voice to 
this perspective, noting that the 100:1 ratio remains "a policy judg­
ment, pure and simple."134 The court elaborated, "Matters of pol­
icy typically are for Congress. [I]n the absence of constitutional 
infirmity, federal courts are bound by Congress's policy judgments, 
including judgments concerning the appropriate penalties for fed­
eral crimes."135 In this view, judges should apply § 3553(a)'s factors 
in an individualized manner to the particular defendants before 
131. Cf John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (distinguish­
ing between the decision to justify a practice and the decision to justify a particular 
action falling under that practice). 
132. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060 (D. Neb. 2005) (rejecting 
crack defendant's request for a lower sentence), affd, 439 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), 
petition for cert. filed (No. 06-5244 May 31, 2006). 
133. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed 
(No. 05-11659 June 20, 2006). 
134. United Stated v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2006). 
135. Id. (citations omitted). 
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them,136 but they should not be in the business of making categori­
cal decisions about sentencing policy. 
B. The "Policy" Distinction 
In reaching this conclusion, these judges have seized upon a 
powerful and ultimately persuasive intuition. However, the basis of 
the structural argument remains vague and inarticulate. The courts 
have asserted that judges should not "make policy judgments," but 
they have failed both to justify the assertion and to define what 
counts as "policy." This leaves the structural approach vulnerable 
to critics who claim that it is incoherent-indeed, one might think 
that the structural focus on "policy" is no better in this regard than 
the substantive focus on "disparity." For example, sentencing 
scholar Douglas Berman has argued, "[A]ll judicial sentencing deci­
sions plainly are, at some level, policy judgments informed by views 
on just punishment, crime control, procedural fairness, and other 
express and implicit considerations. "137 Another observer makes 
the point even more provocatively, claiming, "Those who say judges 
shouldn't impose sentences based on policy are clinging desperately 
to the last shards of a mandatory Guidelines system."138 These crit­
ics make fair points, but I believe the objections rest on some fun­
damental misunderstandings. Hence, in this Part, let us articulate 
the structural argument more clearly, asking first what we mean by 
"policy judgments" and second why judges should refrain from 
making them. We will then apply this general analysis to the crack­
powder issue. 
The critics are correct to note that, in some sense, a judge 
"makes policy" every time she makes a ruling. In Holmesian terms, 
one might think that policy is a "prophec[y] of what the courts will 
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."139 Nobody disputes the 
first half of Holmes' remark-that every judicial decision may have 
the consequence of policy-for every decision affects the rights and 
136. See Eura, 440 F.3d at 634-39 (Michael, J., concurring). 
137. Posting of Douglas Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http:// 
sentencing. typepad. com/sentencing_law _and_policy /2006/05/ policy _judgment. html 
(May 7, 2006,16:51 EST) (emphasis omitted) (posting titled "Policy Judgments at Fed­
eral Sentencing: Aren't They Inevitable and Mandated by Congress?"). 
138. Posting of David Lewis to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing. 
typepad.com/sentencin~law_and_policy/2006/05/policyjudgment.html (May 8, 2006, 
10:51 EST) (responding to posting of Douglas Berman). 
139. Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 
(1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten­
tious, are what I mean by the law."). 
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fortunes of individuals in some way. However, the second half of 
Holmes' remark-that consequences are all that matter-is more 
contestable and indeed highlights the key area of disagreement. 
Our intuition that judges should not make policy runs deeper than 
consequences and rests on concerns about the nature of judicial de­
cisions. To side with Holmes and the critics is to claim that judicial 
decisions do not differ fundamentally in their nature; they are all of 
the same kind, and that kind has only substantive and no structural 
content. I believe our intuitions about the nature of sentencing de­
cisions run in the other direction. The courts have been right to 
distinguish a policy-based decision as a particular kind of sentenc­
ing decision. 
What, then, defines whether a decision has the nature of pol­
icy? While no simple answer presents itself, one can identify policy 
rationales by a set of five defining qualities: principle, generality, 
prospectivity, the nature of the facts, and legislative intent. One 
can find hints at each of these factors in the cases discussing the 
crack-powder ratio, and also in other areas of the law,140 but they 
have not yet been appreciated. 
1. Principle 
Efforts to identify uniquely legislative judgments often distin­
guish between the choice of foundational principles and the choice 
of how to apply those principles in an individual case.141 This factor 
has been conceptualized in various ways. As one judge put it rather 
morbidly, "[T]he determination that one crime is 'worse' for society 
than another crime ... is a ... value judgment. . .. [W]hen it comes 
to punishment, judges lack the legitimacy of legislators ... to create 
their own categories of evil."142 In this view, legislative policy judg­
ments are the kind of judgments that establish the deep premises 
underlying sentencing. As a general principle becomes more spe­
cific, it loses the aura of policy and takes on that of application. 
Other observers have suggested that certain kinds of principled 
judgments are better suited to legislative policymaking than to ad­
140. Administrative law sometimes makes an analogous distinction between "leg­
islative" and "adjudicative" agency decisions. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 
373 (1908) (holding that a municipal tax levied on a select group of property owners 
required individualized adjudication), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali­
zation, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that a general tax levied on all taxable prop­
erty did not require individual adjudication). 
141. See generally Rawls, supra note 131. 
142. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (D. Neb. 2005), affd, 439 
F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (No. 06-5244 May 31, 2006). 
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judication. For example, John Rawls argued that utilitarian and re­
tributive punishment theories can be reconciled, since "utilitarian 
arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about practices 
[i.e., policy], while retributive arguments fit the application of par­
ticular rules to particular cases."143 In a related vein, Douglas 
Berman has suggested a distinction between offense conduct and 
offender characteristics, the former being better suited for legisla­
tion and proof at trial and the latter being better left to the discre­
tion of judges.144 
2. Generality 
Another way of identifying a policy decision is to look at the 
scope of its application. Policy judgments tend to affect a large 
number of people, and they tend to treat people as part of a statisti­
cal mass. They speak categorically. As one judge has put it, "for a 
judge to independently designate categories of offenders and of­
fenses for singular treatment is tantamount to the establishment of 
sentencing policy. "145 
3. Prospectivity 
Policy judgments tend to be forward-looking in nature, while 
adjudicative judgments tend to be backward-looking. Policy judg­
ments have a strong predictive effect. They are made in order to 
affect the future, not usually to account for some particular past act. 
4. Nature of the facts 
Policy judgments tend to apply broadly to a variety of factual 
situations. They do not require detailed knowledge of the particu­
lar situations to which they apply, and they do not depend on facts 
that are difficult to quantify and ascertain in the aggregate. 
143. Rawls, supra note 131, at 5. 
144. Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Charac­
teristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277,287 (2005) ("Trials are 
about establishing the specific-offense conduct that the state believes merits criminal 
punishment; sentencing is about assessing both the offense and the offender in order to 
impose a just and effective punishment."). 
145. United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (M.D. Fla. 
2006); see also United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) (characterizing the 
district court's rejection of the 100:1 ratio as "categorical, policy-based"); United States 
v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87, 97 (D.C.C. 2006) ("But what Congress's policy choice does 
mean is that courts cannot categorically treat as similar that which Congress has chosen 
to treat as dissimilar. "). 
650 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:619 
5. Legislative intent 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, policy judgments can be 
defined in functional terms. Even if one rejects the search for a 
Platonic definition of "policy," one can still accept the Forrest 
Gump version: Policy is as policy does. That is, something becomes 
a policy issue primarily because Congress has chosen to make it so. 
This is what the Framers meant when they vested the "legislative 
power" in Congress. l46 
Of course, one can quibble with the ability of individual factors 
to describe our intuitions about policy, and one can also quibble 
with the application of anyone of these factors. Taken together, 
however, the five factors seem to acquire some descriptive and de­
terminative power. Let us now move to our second question. Once 
a policy judgment has been identified as such, why should judges 
defer such judgments to the legislature? Here, the argument is fa­
miliar and rests on concerns related to democratic representation 
and accountability and the comparative institutional competence of 
judges and legislatures. Judges abiding by the 100:1 ratio have in­
voked these themes. One judge colorfully explained his restraint: 
To be clear, if I were the "King," I would adopt [a 20:1 ratio]. My 
disagreement with judges who use Booker to [adopt their own 
ratios] is not primarily that their reasons are faulty in the ab­
stract, but that they give insufficient deference to Congress' con­
trary, but reasonable, policy preferences.147 
Under the old rehabilitative ideal of criminal sentencing, judi­
cial discretion posed few problems. Only judges could adequately 
assess an offender's potential for rehabilitation. In many ways, the 
rehabilitative model conceived of punishment as a private matter 
between judge and defendant. However, as our sentencing system 
came to embrace theories of punishment such as retribution, deter­
rence, and incapacitation, it has encompassed broader values and 
concerns that affect the entire political community-values that are 
the subject of public interest. As such, these concerns demand res­
olution in a public, democratic manner. More practically, judges 
lack the institutional capacity to make policy judgments in a consis­
tent way. Since policy judgments tend to be categorical, they are 
better made at the legislative level than through a number of dispa­
rate decisions by various judges. This appeal to consistency in ap­
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
147. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 n.9. 
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plication of the law returns us to that old nutshell of disparity. But 
disparity becomes coherent once one concludes that Congress has 
made a policy choice that allows one to distinguish between "war­
ranted" and "unwarranted" disparity. If Congress has a clear and 
ascertainable preference, consistent application of that preference 
does indeed limit unwarranted disparity. 
After considering what makes something a policy judgment, 
we can more clearly assess the 100:1 ratio in light of the factors we 
have identified. The first factor, regarding principles, is probably 
the least helpful, since § 3553(a) can be read as a grab bag of sen­
tencing principlef" and thus an effective delegation of authority to 
set guiding principles. The 100:1 ratio is more like a subsidiary con­
clusion than a basic principle of sentencing. However, the next 
three factors-generality, prospectivity, and the nature of the 
facts-weigh heavily in favor of treating the 100:1 ratio as a policy 
judgment. The 100:1 ratio is, after all, a ratio. It aims to establish a 
relationship between two different offenses. This is a broad, cate­
gorical judgment that applies prospectively to general classes of ac­
tion. Indeed, a policy judgment that establishes the relative degree 
of punishment between two offenses is only a short step from the 
paradigmatic policy choice of which actions to classify as crimes. 
Finally, the factor weighing most heavily in favor of treating 
the 100:1 ratio as a policy choice is legislative intent. Critics of the 
ratio point out that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory and 
thus do not carry the force of law. After Booker, statutory 
mandatory minimums are the only formal legislative enactments 
constraining judges' abilities to deviate from the 100:1 ratio.148 But 
although these critics are formally correct, they miss the point. In 
light of Booker's standard of review, a sentencing judge's decision 
need not violate a statute to nevertheless run afoul of structural 
reasonableness. If legislative intent is clear, a judge's decision to 
thwart that intent may be unreasonable. Indeed, this is the case 
with the 100:1 ratio. Congress has spoken clearly to the policy is­
sue, albeit informally. Although the mandatory minimums only set 
a limit on the ability of a judge to discard the 100:1 ratio, the mini­
mums remain strong evidence of congressional intent. It would be 
unreasonable to think that when Congress enshrined the 100:1 ratio 
in the mandatory minimum statute it did not also aim for this ratio 
to control sentences above and below the minimums. Moreover, 
the 100:1 ratio has not resulted from legislative error, ignorance, or 
148. Of course, § 3553(a) is a statutory constraint too, but a rather soft one. 
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neglect. Rather, Congress and the Sentencing Commission have 
engaged in an ongoing dialogue over the ratio. On multiple occa­
sions, Congress has considered and rejected alternative ratios.149 
One hopes Congress may yet adopt the Commission's recommen­
dations, but until then, it remains difficult to deny that Congress has 
made its choice. As a matter of structural reasonableness, judges 
should defer to this clear policy choice. 
Critics may reasonably worry that the structural approach 
leaves them with nothing, and that it comes dangerously close to 
running afoul of Booker by making the Guidelines mandatory 
again. Yet, this need not be the case. Although structural reasona­
bleness requires judges to defer to the P9licy judgments of Con­
gress, policy judgments by nature tend to be overinclusive. That is, 
their effects tend to reach beyond their intended purposes. Indeed, 
this had been a chief argument against the exhaustingly detailed 
mandatory Guidelines.1so Hence, the significance of Booker lies in 
the new freedom it gives judges to reject Guidelines policy choices 
when the policy does not fit the circumstances of individual cases. 
In this sense, judges can finally escape the distant utilitarianism of 
policy-setting and the cold regularity of bureaucratic application 151 
by focusing on the humane aspect of their sentencing task-under­
standing the unique circumstances of the defendant. Judges can 
prevent the tyranny of overinclusive policy choices not by imposing 
their own rival policy choices, but rather by explaining how a partic­
ular defendant engenders individualized reasons-indeed, reasons 
based on § 3553(a)-to deviate from the Guidelines in a given case. 
As Fourth Circuit Judge M. Blane Michael hinted in his con­
curring opinion in United States v. Eura, objections to the 100:1 ra­
tio "can be considered insofar as they are refracted through an 
individual defendant's case. "152 Judge Michael did not elaborate on 
how this process would work, but our own discussion of the argu­
ment against the 100:1 ratio points the way. Recall that the best 
argument against the 100:1 ratio is not a categorical one based on 
the pharmacological nature of crack or on the disparate impact the 
ratio entails. Rather, the central problem with the 100:1 ratio is 
149. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
150. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 121-24 (discussing "the arbitrari­
ness of uniformity"). 
151. See id. at 103. 
152. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., 
concurring). 
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that it fails to account for individual culpability.153 It measures the 
increased harm caused by crack, but it does not account for the 
relatively lesser culpability of low-level dealers and users. By over­
weighing harm and under-weighing culpability, the 100:1 ratio fre­
quently leads to injustice in individual cases and fails to serve the 
original intent of the Sentencing Reform Act. Judges can thus 
avoid making policy choices and limit the damage caused by the 
100:1 ratio by deviating from the Guidelines in cases where the de­
fendant is not a major drug trafficker or manufacturer. This indi­
vidualized approach is both consistent with structural 
reasonableness and effective in reducing the perverse effects of the 
100:1 ratio. 
C. Standards of Review 
We come finally to the question of how structural reasonable­
ness might be effectuated doctrinally. Booker's concept of "reason­
ableness" can devolve into an incoherent and inarticulate 
incantation, or it can evolve into the raw material out of which 
guiding common law presumptions and rules fruitfully spring. 
Hence, to become truly reasonable, the concept of "reasonable­
ness" must be divided into manageable pieces. The courts have al­
ready adopted one such piecemeal rule-the presumption of 
reasonableness accorded to within-Guidelines sentences. This is a 
sensible beginning, since the presumption-so long as it is rebutta­
ble-gives the Guidelines an "anchoring effect"154 without making 
them determinative in individual cases (and thus unconstitutionally 
mandatory).155 However, the courts have not yet fully elaborated 
the standard of review for non-Guidelines sentences. 
Some judges have chosen to use the old "abuse of discretion" 
standard.156 Others have applied something closer to "de novo."157 
And still other judges insist that review be for "'unreasonable­
153. See supra Part II.A. 
154. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity, supra note 109, at 645. 
155. I should note that many people disagree with this characterization and worry 
that the presumption of reasonableness veers too close to unconstitutional waters. The 
full debate over this presumption lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, since 
the presumption can be rebutted, I believe that it serves primarily an informational 
function, communicating a national norm against which individual judges can make 
their own independent assessments. 
156. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2006). 
157. See, e.g., United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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ness,'" pure and simple.158 We need not decide the question here 
in its entirety, but the notion of structural reasonableness that 
emerges from the dispute over the 100:1 ratio helps us make a con­
tribution to the effort. In short, we should adopt a two-tiered scru­
tiny regime, whereby individualized sentencing decisions are 
reviewed deferentially and policy-based decisions are subject to 
heightened scrutiny. Appellate courts could police the boundaries 
of structural reasonableness by first determining whether a judge's 
sentencing decision is individualized or policy-based in nature, and 
then applying deference to the former and heightened scrutiny to 
the latter. 
As explained in this Part, the structural approach has no inten­
tion of stamping out individualized substantive sentencing consider­
ations; it does not aim to make the Guidelines mandatory. Instead, 
it simply asks judges to read § 3553(a) with an individualized gloss, 
rather than a categorical policy-focused one. Review for structural 
reasonableness fulfills the newfound duty of the appellate courts to 
ensure that the system as a whole functions reasonably. Only in 
this way can we avoid the "discordant symphony" predicted by 
Booker's dissenters.159 
IV. STRUCTURAL REASONABLENESS IN PRACTICE 
Two examples will serve to highlight the difference between 
the approach recommended here and the alternative approach 
taken by some critics of the 100:1 ratio. The first example comes 
from a district court case that exemplifies the former approach. In 
United States v. Smith,160 officers responding to a fire caught the 
defendant in possession of approximately 70 grams of crack and 650 
grams of powder cocaine.16i After applying the Guidelines and 
granting the government's request for a § 5K1.1 departure for sub­
stantial assistance, the judge calculated a Guidelines range of forty­
one to fifty-one months. 162 Then, the judge made an individualized 
assessment of the defendant based on the § 3553(a) factors. She 
observed: "Although the offense was serious, no aggravating cir­
cumstances were present. Defendant did not appear to have ever 
committed or threatened violence or to have sold large quantifies 
158. See, e.g., Menyweather, 447 F.3d at 639 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005». 
159. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
160. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 
161. Id. at 773. 
162. Id. at 776. 
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[sic] of drugS."163 The defendant had maintained a clean record 
during the two years between when the offense occurred and when 
the government charged him.164 The judge also found the defen­
dant to be "genuinely remorseful."165 But, she observed, "[H]is 
guideline offense level was high because he possessed crack co­
caine."166 Noting that "the 100:1 ratio actually targets low level 
dealers in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the 1986 Act,"167 
she concluded that "guideline sentences vary widely based on facts 
that have little to do with culpability."168 In the case before her, 
however, the individualized need to take culpability into account 
demanded that she give an eighteen-month sentence.169 
Now, compare Smith to Simon v. United States,17o another 
crack case also resulting in a below-Guidelines sentence. Agents 
conducted a stakeout at the defendant's residence, after which he 
fled from the police. l71 In his residence, agents found 600 grams of 
crack, forged identification documents, a loaded submachine gun, 
$72,000 in cash, and all of the accoutrements of a crack manufactur­
ing and dealing operation.In For this major offense, the Guidelines 
advised a sentence of 324 to 405 months.173 The judge cited his 
belief, and that of the Sentencing Commission, that the 100:1 ratio 
exaggerated the harm caused by crackp4 Accordingly, he chose to 
apply a 20:1 ratio and impose a 262-month sentence, which would 
have been at the top of the resulting Guidelines rangeP5 The 
judge's restraint in imposing a sentence at the top of the resulting 
range stemmed from his qualms about the disparity that his depar­
ture from the 100:1 ratio would necessarily engender.176 The of­
fender's co-defendant, who was guilty of identical criminal conduct 
and had the same criminal history, had already been sentenced ac­
cording to the 100:1 ratio.177 
163. Id. at 776. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 777. 
166. Id. at 776. 
167. Id. at 778. 
168. Id. at 780. 
169. Id. at 782. 
170. Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
171. Id. at 41. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 46. 
174. Id. at 44-46. 
175. Id. at 49. 
176. Id. at 46-47. 
177. Id. at 48-49. 
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Although the judge showed some commendable moderation, 
Simon still stands as a useful example of a case in which a deviation 
from the 100:1 ratio was not warranted. The defendant was a very 
culpable, high-level crack dealer, and there were few compelling in­
dividualized reasons to treat him leniently. Likely understanding 
this, but wanting to voice his disagreement with the 100:1 ratio, the 
judge imposed a lower sentencePS However, since the lower sen­
tence was not based on individualized factors, rejecting the 100:1 
ratio created clear disparity between the offender and his identical 
co-defendant. When the two offenders meet in prison, it remains 
hard to imagine that the higher-sentenced co-defendant would feel 
that his partner in crime had been sentenced in a way that "pro­
mote[ed] respect for the law."179 
Smith and Simon represent the two different paths available to 
judges confronting the 100:1 ratio in the wake of Booker. Smith 
manages to uphold the principles of structural reasonableness while 
also limiting the ill effects of the 100:1 ratio. In contrast, Simon 
reflects the principles, and problems, of substantive reasonableness 
by replacing one kind of disparity with another glaring one. On a 
practical level, the former approach also manages to accomplish a 
moderate and flexible solution to the decades-old problem of the 
100:1 ratio. It allows for the ratio to be abandoned in just those 
cases in which it proves the most troublesome. By restraining 
judges from making overreaching policy pronouncements, this ap­
proach also achieves consistency with the separation of powers and 
avoids the backlash that would inevitably result from full-scale judi­
cial nullification of Congress's policy choice. Short of congressional 
action to amend the ratio, structural reasonableness offers the best 
hope of resolving a deeply controversial problem. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that judges are already wisely 
moving in this direction, quietly and passively softening the blow of 
the 100:1 ratio by limiting its impact in individual cases.1SO Recall 
that only thirty-five below-Guidelines sentences so far have been 
based on categorical rejection of the 100:1 ratio, but judges have 
178. Id. at 49. 
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
180. This phenomenon of "passive resistance" may not be unique to the post­
Booker period. One pre-Booker empirical study observed, "[B]eginning in about 1992, 
every available indicator suggests that front-line actors in the sentencing system em­
ployed their discretion to an ever-increasing degree to lower drug sentence length." 
Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of 
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 477, 554 (2002). 
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given below-Guidelines sentences in 610 crack cases since Booker, 
and they are doing so at a higher rate than in powder cocaine 
cases.181 Most of these 610 sentences have indeed been based on 
individualized, rather than policy-focused, sentencing rationales.182 
Undoubtedly, partisan champions of judicial discretion will lament 
the thirty-five, and partisan champions of determinate sentencing 
will lament all 610. But the rest of us can take comfort in that old­
est of practical virtues-moderation. 
CONCLUSION: THE SECRET AMBITION OF § 3553(a) 
This Article has advanced on three fronts. Conceptually, it has 
distinguished between substantive and structural approaches to as­
sessing the reasonableness of the 100:1 ratio, and I have argued that 
the substantive approach leads to an irresolvable clash of dispari­
ties. Only a structural approach can take us beyond this clash. 
Doctrinally, I have sought to give content to this structural ap­
proach. I sketched the factors that distinguish policy rationales 
from individualized rationales, and proposed a standard of review 
that gives heightened scrutiny to the former and deference to the 
latter. Finally, and practically, we have seen how the structural ap­
proach's distinction between policy and individualized rationales 
helps achieve a reasonably balanced solution to the crack-powder 
controversy. 
Criminal law scholar Dan Kahan has argued that public talk of 
deterrence, even if frequently based on ill-supported beliefs, has a 
useful "cooling effect" on our political discourse.183 It allows us to 
mask the contentious issues of moral condemnation that really mo­
tivate our opinions on crime and punishment, while making room 
to talk about these issues in a way that mutes controversy and divi­
siveness.184 This, in Kahan's view, is the "secret ambition" of deter­
rence.l85 In the post-Booker milieu, we might also speak in a 
similar way of the secret ambition of § 3553(a). Like Kahan's view 
of deterrence, a good case can be made that a substantive reading 
of § 3553(a) has little value in determining a judge's sentencing de­
cision. One judge colorfully described § 3553(a) as "a theoretical 
181. See supra Part I.B. 
182. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 82 (listing various rationales that 
have been cited by judges imposing below-Guidelines sentences). 
183. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
448 (1999). 
184. See id. at 476-77. 
185. Id. at 435. 
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rendition of the supposed attributes of the (mythological) perfect 
sentence, a shorthand surrogate for all the arguments about punish­
ment that have raged over time without resolution."186 This is 
surely true. But more importantly, substantive talk about § 3553(a) 
masks and mutes the deepest structural issue left wide open in the 
wake of Booker: What balance should we strike between judicial 
discretion, appellate oversight, administrative expertise, and legisla­
tive control? Debates over the proper interpretation of § 3553(a) 
are really debates over how to answer this question. 
Like Kahan's deterrence talk, "substantive reasonableness" 
discourse can cool some of the deeply felt structural tugs-of-war 
that have characterized sentencing law and policy. This may indeed 
be an accurate descriptive theory, explaining why much judicial dis­
cussion of cocaine sentencing has been preoccupied with disparity 
talk. However, there does come a.,time when peaceful ambiguity 
must yield to contested clarity. In the wake of Booker, judges can­
not avoid the need to engage structurally with sentencing dis­
putes-to ask not what particular sentence § 3553(a) requires, but 
rather to ask what kinds of decisions § 3553(a) permits. We have 
attempted to take a step in that direction. And in doing so, we have 
stumbled upon a practical resolution to what has been a very con­
tentious issue in sentencing policy. Beyond the clash of disparities, 
there is hope. 
186. United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 
2006). 
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